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Note

Collateral Estoppel and the
Right to a Jury Trial
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co. 565 F.2d 815
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674-75
(U.S. May 2, 1978) (No. 77-1305).
I. INTRODUCTION
Determining when the United States Constitution requires a
jury trial in civil actions involves the analysis of various policy
considerations. Relying on Supreme Court decisions of the past
two decades' concerning the seventh amendment, 2 federal
courts have, when faced with this issue, markedly favored a
policy of allowing jury trials in civil cases. Also, with the vast
increase in cases on the federal dockets in recent years, interest
in judicial economy, finality, and avoidance of inconsistent results has increased. In futherance of these policies, the use of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel has also expanded in federal
court cases.
These two considerations-a party's right to a jury trial, and
the use of collateral estoppel-have seemingly clashed in two
federal courts of appeals decisions. In 1971, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Rachal v. Hill,3 was
faced with the issue of whether corporate officers who had
issues of fact determined against them in a non-jury trial of a
Securities and Exchange Commission suit for injunctive relief
are collaterally estopped from relitigating those issues before a
jury in a subsequent class and derivative action for damages
brought by shareholders. The court held that collateral estoppel
did not apply to a non-jury decision when it would interfere with
the right of the defendant to a jury trial in a subsequent action
1. E.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
2.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
3. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
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at law.4 Five years later this same issue was presented to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Shore
v. ParklaneHosiery Co.,5 the court found the reasoning in Rachal unpersuasive and held that collateral estoppel prohibited
relitigation of those issues earlier decided. This note will
concern itself with the holding in Shore, and discuss the reasons
the second circuit felt Rachal was wrongly decided. Finally, the
effect of these two decisions on various policy considerations of
both procedure and the security laws will be examined.
II. THE FACTS
The class action in Shore was commenced in November 1974,
on behalf of stockholders of the Parklane Hosiery Company
(Parklane) against the corporation and various officers, directors, and shareholders. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants
issued a false and misleading proxy statement violating sections
10(b), 6 13(a), 7 14(a),8 and 20(a) 9 of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. The individual defendants controlled over seventy percent
of the corporation's outstanding stock, and the proxy statement
was in furtherance of a proposed merger to convert Parklane
from a publicly-held corporation to a privately-owned company
controlled entirely by the defendants. The merger was
completed and the minority shareholders, including the plaintiff, were offered two dollars per share for their holdings, subject to dissenter's appraisal rights, which were allegedly inadequate because of the misleading proxy.
In May, 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission
brought suit against the defendants 0 alleging, inter alia, violations of sections 10(b), 13(a), and 14(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.11 The allegations of a false and misleading proxy statement were essentially the same as those brought
in the shareholder action. However, the Securities and Exchange Commission sought injunctive relief. The federal dis4. The non-jury trial, being equitable, does not come within the seventh
amendment which is limited to "suits at common law." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII. See note 2 supra.
5. 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3674-75 (U.S. May 2,
1978) (No. 77-1305).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
7. Id. § 78m(a).
8. Id. § 78n(a).
9. Id. § 78t(a).
10. The defendants in the SEC suit were the corporation and Somekh, its
president. 565 F.2d at 817.
11. See notes 6-8, supra.
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trict court judge, sitting without a jury in the equitable action,
found violations of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act but limited relief
to amending the prior filing to correct the misstatements and
nondisclosures, and filing
a Form 10-K for 1975.12 The decision
13
was affirmed on appeal.
On the basis of this decision, the plaintiff in the shareholder
action moved for summary judgment contending that the prior
findings of fact collaterally estopped the defendants from asserting that any genuine issues of material fact regarding liability remained for trial. The district court denied the motion stating the following: "'The within motion is denied. Rachal v. Hill,
435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). So ordered.' "14
III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
In reversing the district court, the second circuit was immediately faced with stating why Rachal was wrongly decided,
as it admitted it could not distinguish that decision. 15 Still, the
court sought to reinforce its decision by looking to the particular facts of Shore:
Were there any doubt about the matter, it should in any event be
resolved against the defendants in this case for the reason that, although they were fully aware of the pendency of the present suit
throughout the non-jury trial of the SEC case, they made no effort to
protect their right to a jury trial of the damage claims asserted by
plaintiffs, either by seeking to expedite trial of the present action or by
requesting ... that the 16
issues in the SEC case be tried by a jury or
before an advisory jury.

This statement does not really distinguish the case from Rachal,
for the defendants in Rachal also did not actively pursue their
jury trial right, and had to rely on the plaintiffs' demand for
their jury trial.'7 The court in Shore made it clear that it was not
distinguishing Rachal but disagreeing with the case by citing
prior decisions of the second circuit which questioned the
correctness of the decision in Rachal.18 For these reasons it may
12.
13.
14.
15.

See SEC v. Parkane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
565 F.2d at 818.
"In Rachal the Fifth Circuit was faced with the question before us ......
Id.
16. Id. at 821-22.
17. Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d at 63 n.4. That court pointed out that the defendants
were entitled to rely on this demand under FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
18. The court mentioned Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332
(2d Cir. 1973). Crane was not concerned with non-mutual estoppel but
stated "we are not at all sure that Rachal was correctly decided." 490 F.2d
at 343 n.15 (citing Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil
Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442 (1971)). Also
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be assumed that Shore would have reached the same result
even if the defendants had done everything within their power
to preserve their seventh amendment rights but were unable to
do so.

19

Rachal v. Hill
In the opening discussion of Rachal, the fifth circuit aligned
itself with those cases not requiring mutuality of parties to apchose not to
ply collateral estoppel. 20 In doing so it apparently
21
decide the case on the grounds of nonmutuality.
A.

Finding no case directly on point,22 the court in Rachal turned to Beacon Theatres v. Westover23 for guidance. The plaintiff
in Beacon Theatres sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from bringing a treble damage suit and the defendant
asserted a compulsory counterclaim 24 for damages and demanded a jury trial. The Supreme Court held that, except under
the most compelling circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for a court to deprive a litigant of his jury trial by deciding
the equitable claim first.25 In light of the respect the Supreme
Court has shown for the preservation of the right to jury trial in
Beacon Theatres and other cases,26 the court in Rachal extended those decisions to reach the fact situation presented to it.

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

mentioned was Goldman, Sachs, & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.
1974), in which an action in which a jury trial had been demanded was
ordered to be tried first to prevent collateral estoppel from denying the
parties' right to a jury trial. This would not have been necessary if the
analysis in Rachal had been applicable. See also SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972) (court refused to be
persuaded by Rachal and instead determined that a private party would
not be allowed to intervene in an SEC injunctive action).
But see Goldman, Sachs, & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Oaks, J., dissenting). Judge Oakes believed that if timely steps were taken
to preserve the right to a jury trial, under such circumstances collateral
estoppel effect should not be given to a prior non-jury trial.
The court in Rachal cited B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225
N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967), and in a footnote discussed the leading
case of Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), in which Justice Traynor dispensed with mutuality,
seeing no rational reason for its continuance. 435 F.2d at 61 n.3.
But see note 50 and accompanying test infra.
435 F.2d at 63.
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
359 U.S. at 508.
Rachal also relied on Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), in which the
Supreme Court held a jury trial under the seventh amendment is not lost
because legal issues are joined or are incidental to equitable issues. 435
F.2d at 64.
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The court in Shore pointed out that not only is Beacon
Theatres not precedent for the situations in Rachal and Shore,
but that
Beacon Theatres implicitly confirms the long-accepted principle that
a non-jury adjudication of issues asserted in an equitable claim will
collaterally estop a later jury trial of the same issues presented by the
same party in a legal claim. Had it not been for that basic assumption
the Supreme Court would not have been concerned about the order in
which the legal and equitable claims were to be tried, since the defendant would then have been guaranteed a jury trial 27of the counterclaim
regardless of the outcome of the equitable claim.

The Shore court noted that this underlying suspicion was
confirmed in Katchen v. Landy,28 in which the Supreme Court
upheld the right of a bankruptcy trustee to recover a preference
through summary judgment over the objection that this would
deny the claimant his right to a jury trial under the seventh

amendment. 29 The second circuit, therefore, felt that Rachal's
reliance on Beacon Theatres was unfounded.
B.

The Policy Grounds.

After noting "the limited scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Beacon Theatres,' 30 Shore looked to various policy considerations to support its conclusion. The second circuit said the
defendants knew the private action was pending, and even if it
were not, the nature of a Securities and Exchange Commission
injunctive suit makes such private actions foreseeable. The
court, therefore, concluded there was no support for the
the
proposition that the defendants did not or would not defend
31
Securities and Exchange Commission suit with full vigor.
The court also emphasized that the defendants had "fully
27. 565 F.2d at 820-21.
28. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
29. The court in Shore pointed out that whereas Beacon Theatres only
speculated as to what "might" be the collateral estoppel effect, Katchen
spoke more conclusively. "For, as we have said, determination of the preference issues in the equitable proceeding would in any case render unnecessary a trial in the plenary action because of the res judicata effect to
which that determination would be entitled." 565 F.2d at 821 (quoting
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. at 339-40).
30. 565 F.2d at 821. The narrow scope of that decision might be questioned in
light of the Supreme Court's broad language in concluding that "only
under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of
the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can
the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of
equitable claims." Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
31. See Comment, The Effect of SEC Injunctionsin SubsequentPrivateDamage Actions-Rachal v. Hill, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1329, 1338-39 (1971) (quoted
favorably in Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d at 822 n.7).
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and fairly adjudicated in a prior proceeding" 32 those issues in
question, and the seventh amendment applies only when
genuine issues of material fact exist. It is for this very reason
that "the court may, without violating Seventh Amendment
rights, grant summary judgment E331 . .. [or] withdraw a case
from the jury and order the entry of a directed verdict 34 where
the evidence ... would not be sufficient to support a verdict in
that party's favor." 35 Because of these analogous situations in
which a jury trial is denied, the court in Shore felt the prior
Securities and Exchange Commission adjudication called for
the same result by the use of collateral estoppel.
The Shore opinion then concluded that to hold that the
seventh amendment provided for a second trial of the same
issues "would violate basic principles of fairness, finality, certainty, economy in utilization of judicial resources, avoidance of
possibly inconsistent results, and achievement of the 'just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' "36
However the court recognized that a doctrine of judicial
convenience must give way to a constitutional mandate. Accordingly, it undertook to determine if the right to jury trial
under the seventh amendment must be preserved on historical
grounds in this instance.
C.

The Historical Grounds.
The court in Shore recognized that the seventh amendment
does not create new jury trial rights, but by its terms simply
"preserves" the right to a jury trial as it existed in 1791.37 On this
basis the defendants asserted that because principles of nonmutual estoppel did not exist in 1791, there would have been no
collateral estoppel effect in 1791 and, therefore, they would have
had a right to a jury trial if this "suit at common law" 38 would
have arisen at that time. Since the amendment preserves a jury
trial right, the defendants logically argued their jury right
would be intact today. The second circuit disagreed with this
assessment of the history and stated that "[s]uch a strict histor32. 565 F.2d at 819.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
565 F.2d at 819.
Id. at 821 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
565 F.2d at 822. The seventh amendment became part of the United States
Constitution in 1791; therefore, it is the common law on that date which is
looked to in order to see if a jury trial right which then existed has been
preserved.
38. The court pointed out that the term did not embrace equitable claims. Id.
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ical approach to the Seventh Amendment, which would freeze

been somethe jury trial at its 1791 level-no more, no less-has
39
what weakened by recent pronouncements."

The court could find no eighteenth century analogue or

counterpart to a Securities and Exchange Commission injunctive suit or a shareholder suit based on fraud in violation of the
securities laws. Consequently, it could not "determine what jury
trial and collateral estoppel rules would have been developed or
applied" in 1791.40 Noting that law courts in 1791 were willing to

respect decrees in equity,41 and considering the limitations upon
historical inquiry, the court stated, "[w]e should not be confined
to a rigid strait-jacket merely because of the lack of a common
law analogue and the absence of any 1791 authority for extension of the42equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel to the present case."
IV. ANALYSIS
While Shore appears correct in much of its criticism and
resulting disagreement with the reasoning in Rachal, the out-

come of Rachal is not as obviously incorrect. Despite the criti-

cism of Rachal by some commentators, 43 its outcome had been
approved by nearly every other state and federal court which
had decided the same or similar issues,4 including the definite

39. Id.. The court then quoted from Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10

40.
41.

42.
43.

44.

(1970), in which the Supreme Court found that because of the "extensive
and possibly abstruse historical inquiry" involved in historical approaches,
such approaches are "most difficult to apply." Commentators have observed that this inquiry was further complicated by the merger of law and
equity early in the twentieth century. See, e.g., Note, Right to Twelve-Man
Jury; Constitutionalityof PretrialProsecutorialDiscovery, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 165, 175-76 (1969); McCoid, ProceduralReform and the Right to Jury
Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1967) (both cited in Shore). See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 8.1 to .11 (2d ed. 1977); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 92 (2d ed. 1970);
Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A
Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 448-49 (1971).
565 F.2d at 823.
See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 39, at 450-54 (full analysis of the
legal treatises of the period and conclusion that as a rule equitable decrees
were binding on the same parties in subsequent actions in courts at law).
Accord, RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment j (1942); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
565 F.2d at 823.
Most notably Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 39. See also McWilliams,
FederalAntitrust Decrees:Should They Be Given ConclusiveEffect in a
Subsequent Private Action?, 48 Miss. L.J. 1 (1977). The author criticizes
Rachal's effect in the antitrust area, and takes the position advocated by
Shapiro and Coquiliette.
E.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104,111 n.7 (7th Cir.
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approval of a federal district court in the second circuit. 45 The
Restatement of Judgments46 also took Rachal into account in
revising its sections on issue preclusion. While adhering generally to the proposition that other persons not a party to the first
judgment are nevertheless precluded from relitigating the issue
the same as parties to the judgment are precluded, the Restatement lists seven circumstances in which that may not be the

result. One such circumstance is applicable to Rachal: "The
forum in the second action affords the party against whom
preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of the issue that were not available in the
first action and that might likely result in the issue's being

differently determined.

'47

The comment specifically mentions

the right to a jury trial as such an opportunity. 48 Additionally,
there are several policy considerations, either not mentioned or
1974) (approved Rachal in holding a judge's decision for the defendant
United States would not have collateral estoppel effect for the other defendants because it would short circuit the plaintiffs' right to a jury trial);
Lyne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1182,
1184 (3d Cir. 1972) (arbitration award declared not final, one reason being
Rachal would not allow deprivation of a jury trial, which would have been
the result if the arbitration award was given collateral estoppel effect);
SEC v. Standard Life Corp., 413 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (request for
jury trial in SEC injunctive suit not granted because Rachal would give a
jury trial in any later private actions); McCook v. Standard Oil Co., 393 F.
Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (followed Rachal to allow jury trial and deny
collateral estoppel effect to a prior government civil antitrust case in equity); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561-62 n.9 (S.D. Fla.
1973) (dictum) (collateral estoppel effect not given where the first case was
in admirality); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Woods, 137 Ga. App. 693, 224 S.E.2d
763 (1976) (approved Rachal in holding state constitutional right to jury
trial prohibited collateral estoppel effect of a decision of the Georgia State
Workmen's Compensation Board).
McCook v. Standard Oil Co., 393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1975), though
strongly relying on Rachal, differs because § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976), provides that civil and criminal antitrust cases brought
by the government will be considered primafacie evidence in later private
actions. This result was criticized in McWilliams, supra note 43, at 22-28.
45. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990,993-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The district court found Rachal controlling on nearly the exact fact pattern. See also Essex Systems Co. v. Steinberg, 335 F. Supp. 298, 302
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (dictum). Apparently the only cases to seriously question
the correctness of Rachal were those second circuit decisions discussed in
note 18 supra.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1975).

47. Id.
48. Id. Comment d. See also id., Explanatory Notes § 88, Comment d at 100,
which cites Rachal when stating that "[tihe differences between the procedures available in the first and second actions, while not sufficient to deny
issue preclusion between the same parties, may warrant a refusal to carry
over preclusion to an action involving another party." Id.
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not fully discussed in Rachal, which raise some questions about
the result in Shore. There are also considerations which reinforce the Shore decision, and all these factors must be weighed
in an attempt to determine which is the more desirable result.
The first holding of Rachal agreed with those decisions
which had dispensed with the requirement of mutuality in the
application of collateral estoppel.4 9 But it then used non-mutuality to distinguish at least one other case which would otherwise
have been on point.5° Thus, there appears to be some question as
to what, if any, reliance was put on non-mutuality in the Rachal
opinion. Similarly, Shore dispensed with mutuality by citing
prior decisions 51 and maintaining that whatever doubt there
might have been on the issue was resolved by the Supreme
Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation.2 However, this appears to be an oversimplification by Shore, for mutuality is still considered a requirement for collateral estoppel by many courts in some circumstances.
For example, it has been suggested5 3 that courts might best
serve the parties' interests by distinguishing between the offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel. It is generally
agreed that mutuality should not be required for defensive
use,5 4 and indeed Bernhardv. Bank of America National Trust
& Savings Association,55 the landmark California Supreme
Court case in which Justice Traynor first dispensed with mutuality, was a defensive use of collateral estoppel.5 6 So too was
Blonder-Tongue,57 and as a result some federal courts have
49. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
50. 435 F.2d at 63 n.5. Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting
Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969), was the case Rachal distinguished by
stating that the parties were the same in the second action. A second reason
given in the footnote for distinguishing the case was that the jury trial issue
was not raised. The seemingly inconsistent treatment of the mutuality issue
is mentioned in Comment, supra note 31, at 1334.
51. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); Bernard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
52. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.

See, e.g., Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of

CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
Id. at 1019-26.
19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
That Justice Traynor had in mind limiting the doctrine of non-mutuality to
cases of defensive use is not apparent from his opinion, however.
"But the case before us involves neither due process nor 'offensive use'
questions." 402 U.S. at 330. The Supreme Court in that case held that a
determination of patent invalidity against a party suing as a plaintiff in an
infringement action was binding when it subsequently sued to enforce the
patent against others.
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kept alive the requirement of mutuality in certain situations in
which collateral estoppel is used offensively. Such an example
is McCook v. Standard Oil of California.8 In McCook, the
court refused to apply collateral estoppel offensively without
mutuality of parties because to do so would have denied the
defendant a jury trial when one was unavailable in the first

action. This is similar to the Shore situation 59 and, not surpris-

ingly, the McCook court relied heavily on Rachal. Despite the
fact that some courts have done away with the requirement of
mutuality both offensively and defensively, 0 it is surprising
that Rachal did not mention this distinction in its puzzling discussion of mutuality, 61 and that the second circuit in Shore felt
that the matter was so conclusively decided.
Rachal did not rely on a historical analysis of the seventh
amendment for its decision. In fact, it did not mention anything
about historical inquiry. Shore found that the history of the
amendment did not mandate a jury trial, relying on critics of the
Rachal decision. 62 But at least one court in similar circumstances has stated that it was not the seventh amendment which
compelled the jury trial in Rachal, but rather "the public policy
63
in favor of jury trials growing out of the Seventh Amendment"
58. 393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
59. But McCook does differ in that it is based on § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). See note 44 supra.
60. E.g., B.R. DeWitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1967).
61. See note 50 supra.
62. See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 39.
63. McCook v. Standard Oil, 393 F. Supp. 256, 259 (C.D. Cal. 1975). McCook's
analysis is an interesting one:
While Rachal seemingly bases its conclusion on the Seventh
Amendment, it is just as appropriate to read the case as authority
for the proposition that (1) collateral estoppel applies only when the
doctrine "will not result in injustice to the party against whom it is
asserted under the particular circumstances of the case,". . . and
(2) this "injustice" results when the doctrine interferes with the
"great respect" our tribunals have afforded the public policy favoring jury trials .... If this interpretation is correct, then the case
would not be contrary to the conclusion reached in The Fetish of
Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv. L.
Rev. 442 (1971), that the Seventh Amendment does not preclude a
defendant in a subsequent civil action at law from being collaterally estopped by a prior action in equity.
Id.
The historical analysis of Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 39, is
strongly criticized in Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 648-49 n.33 (1973):
The obvious implication, which other portions of the article in
question make clear, is that the seventh amendment jury in civil
cases is such a drag on efficient judicial administration . . . and
results in such inflated damage awards,. . . that it should be avoided (here, in favor of the undefended values of collateral estoppel)
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which made denying the collateral estoppel effect of the nonjury trial the proper decision in this situation. That court
thought that "[b]y carving this small exception into the offensive use of collateral estoppel, the court slightly compromises
to litigation and preserves the strong
the policy favoring an end '64
policy favoring jury trial.
Shore was correct in observing that it is unlikely that the use
of collateral estoppel would be unfair or that it would work a
particular hardship on the defendant, given the circumstances.
First, as previously mentioned, 65 the private action was pending
at the time of the Securities and Exchange Commission's injunctive suit, so the defendant knew the likely consequences of
that equitable action. And if the private action had not
commenced until after the completion of the injunctive suit, any
unfairness to Parklane would have been minimal because the
nature of Securities and Exchange Commission suits for injunc66
tive relief makes private shareholder actions foreseeable.
Second, there is little reason to believe that the defendants in
either Shore or Rachal would gain anything by a jury trial in
their second suits. In neither case did the defendants initially
seek a jury trial,67 and only after the collateral estoppel question
appeared did they actively demand their right. This might be
because juries appear more likely than a judge to be unfavorable to large corporations and their officers and directors accused of fraud against minority shareholders. Though only a
hypothesis, this should be no surprise since jurors, who are
small investors, if investors at all, would tend to identify with
the minority shareholders who were allegedly defrauded.
The effects of the decisions in Shore and Rachal on the
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
enforcement of the federal securities laws were not discussed
by either court. Although receiving a set back in recent Supreme Court cases limiting the effect of rule 10b-5 in private
except where the seventh amendment, rather narrowly conceived,
compels otherwise.
... It is submitted that this is, at the least, rather unusual
constitutionalism. The idea of rejecting the underlying value of a
constitutional guarantee, or of viewing the guarantee as burdensome and thus to be restricted-if applied to other portions of the
Bill of Rights-would certainly be rejected.

Id.
64. McCook, 393 F. Supp. 256, 258 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See also notes 44,48, and 63
supra.
65. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
66. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
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suits,6 8 the Commission has made efforts to further enforcement of the federal securities laws through encouraging private
litigation. 69 It appears that by giving collateral estoppel effect to
the Securities and Exchange Commission's suit, the result in
Shore is encouraging private litigation by allowing injured
shareholders to take advantage of the expertise and budget of

the Securities and Exchange Commission in their own suit.
and
However there are other ways this might be accomplished
70
still preserve the defendant's right to a jury trial.
Intertwined with the Commission's efforts to enforce the
security laws through private enforcement has been a major

effort to obtain some type of restitution as ancillary relief in the
Commission's injunctive actions. The federal courts, in asserting broad equitable powers, have granted such supplemental
71
relief and the practice is becoming increasingly common.
68. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
69. This is because of the sometimes limited effect of after-the-fact injunctive
decrees in one-time-only occurrences. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 31, at
1336-37.
70. One alternative is to ask for an advisory jury pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
39(c). However, a federal district court recently denied that this was a
viable alternative in SEC v. Wills [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,321 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 1978). That court stated that such an advisory jury
would not satisfy the defendant's "perceived constitutional right to jury
trial." Id.
In addition, under FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b), a jury by consent of the parties
might have the same effect as a jury by right. It would appear that if the
SEC consented to a jury trial and the defendant did not, it might be considered a waiver of his jury trial right and the problem would be solved.
Contra,Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990,993-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
Another alternative is considering the prior SEC case as primafacie
evidence, but rebuttable, in the subsequent private litigation, similar to the
rule in antitrust cases. Both the jury trial right and the use of the SEC
expertise and resources are accomplished by this alternative. See McCook
v. Standard Oil, 393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1975); notes 44 and 59 supra.
The SEC could also intervene on behalf of the private plaintiffs in a case
like Shore. Like many of the alternatives this would strain the SEC's
limited resources. Or private claimants could intervene in the SEC injunctive suit, but resulting problems such as the increased difficulty in obtaining consent decrees has made the SEC generally opposed to this. See
generally Comment, supra note 31, at 1340-43.
71. See Ellsworth, Disgorgement in SecuritiesFraudActions Brought by the
SEC, 1977 DUKE L. J. 641, 642 n.4 (1977). The author says some sort of
restitution was sought in approximately 32 percent of those injunctive
actions alleging fraud in 1975. An argument that these disgorgement suits
by the SEC are in fact legal in nature, and therefore entitle the defendant to
a jury trial, was recently rejected by the second circuit in SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc. [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,351 at
93,193 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 1978).

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
While the mechanics of this "disgorgement" are often complex,
generally the defendants place the disgorged funds in an escrow
account, with a court appointed trustee, or make some similar
arrangement, and 72the funds are then distributed to the injured
private claimants.
Given the result of Rachal, such a fund may allow private
claimants to recover their damages much more easily than going through an entire litigation on the claim, though the exact
procedures are far from clear.73 If Shore becomes the accepted
rule, however, the Securities and Exchange Commission may
feel the collateral estoppel effect of their own suit will sufficiently encourage private litigants so that the Commission will
be able to expend less of its limited resources on this type of
ancillary relief than it has in recent years.7 4 Private plaintiffs
would also not be limited to the escrow fund in their recovery, as
they might be when the Commission
obtains disgorgement an75
cillary to their injunctive relief.
Certainly the decision in Shore tends to give more power to
the Securities and Exchange Commission in its dealings with
alleged violators of the federal security laws. An unfavorable
judgment in an injunctive suit brought by the Commission will
collaterally estop the defendants from litigating the issue in a
private action. Consequently a consent agreement between the
Commission and the alleged violator, which may have no collateral estoppel effect on later private actions, is more likely.
Therefore, it would appear Shore puts the Commission in a
position to drive a harder bargain, gaining concessions it might
otherwise have been unable to obtain.
This likely increase in settlements might reduce the number
of Security and Exchange Commission injunctive suits actually
reaching litigation, but the real concern of the courts in giving
72. See Ellsworth, supra note 71, at 666-69.
73. Id. See also Comment, supra note 31, at 1343.
74. The collateral estoppel effect of SEC injunctive suits based on Rule lOb-5
(like Rachal) is unclear in light of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976). There the Supreme Court required scienter to prove rule 10b-5
infractions brought by private claimants. It did not decide if scienter was
required in SEC injunctive suits, and some federal courts have since held it
is not required in such actions, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d
535 (1st Cir. 1976). However, it would appear that if the SEC wanted its
decisions to have meaningful collateral estoppel effect, assuming the adoption of Shore, it would be forced to prove scienter in its injunctive action
anyway. This observation is supported in recent dicta by Judge Friendly.
SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc. [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) q 96, 351 at 93,194 n.4 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 1978).
75. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
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collateral estoppel effect to these suits was the judicial convenience of reducing the backlog on jury trial dockets. 76 Since these
settlements will not have collateral estoppel effect, the number
of jury trials may well remain largely unaffected by the decision
in Shore.
V. CONCLUSION
This note has demonstrated that there is a question whether
Shore corrected the deficient outcome in Rachal, or instead
failed to properly interpret the right to a jury trial preserved by
the seventh amendment. Depending upon one's point of view,
the opinion lends itself to either conclusion. What is clear, however, is that the split in authority among the circuits must be

resolved. Not only will it be unlikely that consistent case law can

now develop in the area, 77 it also seems that the Security and
Exchange Commission is faced with needless uncertainty. The
Commission will have great difficulty maintaining a coherent
policy of enforcement and it will not know which, if any, alternatives 78 to consider if the effect to be given its injunctive suits is

unknown.
CharlesL. Finke '79

76. See, e.g., Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 39, at 457-58; Comment, supra
note 31, at 1341.
77. An example of problems that can result from the conflict among the
circuits is seen in a case decided after Shore, SEC v. Wills [Current Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,321 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 1978). In that case the trial
court denied the defendant's request for a jury trial, which had been asked
for specifically because of the Shore decision. The court noted the conflict
among the circuits but pointedly refused to rule on "the complex collateral
estoppel issues involved." Id. The litigation also has many private actions
pending in different courts; the anomalous result might well be that some
courts will give collateral estoppel effect to the SEC injunctive suit, and
others will not.
See also SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc. [Current Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,351 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 1978). The second circuit ruled,
interalia, that although Shore gave the SEC suit collateral estoppel effect
in subsequent private actions, the defendants were not entitled to a jury
trial in the injunctive suit.
78. See note 70 supra.

